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Exchange Rate Volatility’s Dependence on 
Different Degrees of Competition under 
Different Learning Rules




We assess the phenomenon of excess volatility in intra-day for­
eign exchange markets using a market microstructure approach. 
Introducing different degrees of competition in the forex market 
and applying different learning mechanisms we are able to give a 
rationale for traders’ use of rather simple learning rules: Behaving 
less rationally turns out to be more profitable, thus preserving ra­
tionality in traders’ choice. Competition’s impact on volatility is 
ambiguous: Depending on the variance measure applied volatility 
can be increasing in competition.
“Keywords: Exchange rates, exchange rate volatility, learning, market microstruc­
ture, competition - I would like to thank Professors A. Kirman and S. Vassilakis, and 
G. Fernandez do Cordoba for many useful discussions and comments, and Prof. M. 
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The present paper extends the analysis of Wuthe (1999). There, the 
commonly observed phenomenon of excess volatility in intra-day foreign 
exchange markets was assessed using a market microstructure approach. 
Focusing on the learning behavior of a monopolistic trader and the in­
stitutional setting it was possible to reproduce exchange rate behavior 
which calibrates well with observed time series characteristics.
We continue this analysis introducing different degrees of competition 
in the foreign exchange market. It will be of interest to see how com­
petition influences traders’ behavior and exchange rate volatility, and to 
compare these results with the outcome of the monopoly case. As will 
be seen exchange rate fluctuations diminish with increasing competition 
for many volatility measures, but not for all.
More importantly, we will be able to give a rationale for the use of less 
sophisticated learning rules without the need of referring to the concept 
of bounded rationality. It can be shown that traders in financial markets 
are behaving fully rationally when deciding to apply an unsophisticated 
learning rule. Put differently: Choosing from a menu of different ratio­
nality levels the seemingly least rational one can be seen as a sign of full 
rationality.
The paper will follow the subsequent plan: Section 2 gives a short 
summary of the literature on inventory models with competition. Sec­
tion 3 presents a dynamic model with competition. Section 4 introduces 
the different learning rules the impact of which is being analyzed in the 
simulation part. Sections 5 and 6 describe the simulation set-up and 




























































































2 C om petition  in Inventory M odels
The introduction of competition into inventory models is an exercise 
which can amount to a considerable degree of complexity: Since traders 
will usually transact with the dealer quoting the best price, each dealer’s 
pricing problem depends on the actions of every other dealer. Hence, a 
dealer’s optimal pricing strategy depends on his expectations over the 
actions of the other dealers. In a multi-period framework with order flow 
uncertainty and, maybe, differing risk preferences or knowledge of the 
order flow the decision problem rapidly becomes intractable. To control 
for this various simplifications are usually introduced.
An issue of particular interest to securities markets has been ad­
dressed in the early literature on competition in inventory models: In 
the presence of other dealers willing to provide immediacy market orders 
requiring immediate execution can be crossed with limit orders submit­
ted by traders. Thus, the possibility arises that the interaction of market 
and limit orders provides a sufficient amount of liquidity for a viable se­
curities market similar to the spirit of Demsetz - without the necessity of 
a specialist. Furthermore, an analysis of the characteristics of these two 
order types may indicate how liquidity arises in markets in a different 
way than directly from the market maker. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and 
Whitcomb (1981) address these questions. Assuming exogenously given 
transaction costs - for submitting a limit-order and for its execution or for 
submitting a market order - they are able to construct an interesting dy­
namics of the movement of traders between limits and markets which in 
turn determines the size of the spread. The movement of the competitive 
traders who try to minimize transaction costs depends on the execution 
probability of a market order. The spread exists because, given the un­
derlying transaction costs, some traders prefer to submit a market order 
with certain execution rather than to trade continuously. In the absence 
of transaction costs all orders would be limit orders because the conti­




























































































arises as a consequence of transaction costs. With the spread widening 
more traders prefer to enter limit orders which leads to an increase in 
liquidity available in the market.
The model of Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb does not ex­
plicitly include inventory. However, if traders act as dealers one should 
expect the inventory position to affect the dealers’ willingness to buy or 
sell. Ho and Stoll (1983) investigate this aspect in a model with com­
petitive dealers. Rather than allowing for limit orders dealers can either 
trade between themselves or with customers. While this set-up seems 
quite different from the previous one it should be noted that trading 
with another trader in the interdealer market allows to lock in a certain 
price. Customer deals, on the other hand, allow for more favorable prices 
but imply uncertain execution. Given this kind of environment and the 
presence of competition a dealer’s optimal price-setting task is more com­
plex than the mere balancing of orders. His inventory position exposes 
him to higher risk now since he does not hold a monopoly position for 
clearing order flows.
Ho and Stoll simplify the analysis by assuming a duopoly situation 
in which dealers maximize expected utility of wealth. As in Ho and Stoll 
(1981) dealers are concerned with their portfolio position when under­
taking trading activity. The explicit solution of their model is for one 
period only leaving thus out intertemporal inventory- and possible strate­
gic considerations. Optimal bid and ask prices for each of the two stocks 
traded depend then on the discounted sum of a fixed transaction value 
plus the inventory value (not its size), and on the return variance of the 
stock which is being priced. The inventory value, in turn, depends on 
the variance of the respective stock and the covariance of return between 
the two stocks.
The resulting spread is independent of the value of the inventory and 
the number of stocks that are being traded. Only the spread’s placement 
is affected by the inventory. The size of the spread is basically equal to 




























































































as a monopolist on his side of the market. Trading between the two 
dealers, then, will not occur since prices are essentially identical. Ho 
and Stoll argue that with the presence of more dealers in the market the 
spread diminishes but will always remain positive. This outcome is due 
to interdealer trades which now do occur: A dealer who finds himself 
with a higher inventory position after a transaction has taken place will 
lower his bid price and thus widen the spread. Orders from other dealers 
will then be attracted as the market spread narrows. Consequently, a 
widening of the spread takes place.
Research by Pagano (1989) and Biais (1993) investigates the effects 
of an inclusion of expectations of the other dealers’ actions and the size 
of their inventory. These elements could play no role in the one-period 
model of Ho and Stoll.
Zabel (1981) and O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) both employ a discrete­
time multiperiod framework and depart with this characteristic from pre­
vious modeling approaches, i.e. the continuous-time multiperiod model 
of e.g. Amihud and Mendelson.1 This new framework with prices being 
called out at the beginning of each period allows to incorporate the real­
istic feature that traders can ’’hit a quote” by submitting an order. The 
dealer has to support his price by trading for his own account on demand. 
Extending the horizon infinitely but dividing each trading day in a finite 
number of periods allows also for the inclusion of an overnight market 
where trade settlement can take place independently of order processing.
Suvanto (1993) translates Zabel’s model to the institutional specifics 
of the spot foreign exchange market. He includes competition and the 
presence of an interbank market in the dynamic framework. While 
traders remain price-setters also in a competitive environment their quo­
tations are pulled into a given range around the average market price. 
Apart from inventory considerations the price now, with competition, is 
also adjusted when the average quotation changes.
'Two other discrete-time models of dealer behavior has been developed by Brad- 




























































































The strategy for cover transactions in the interbank market is driven 
by two forces, basically: Traders who wish to undertake some position 
adjustment in the interbank market find themselves on the ’’wrong” side 
of the market. However, if the shadow price lies below the observed 
average interbank bid-rate then the dealer will prefer to cover at least 
part of his long position in the interbank market to a large downward 
adjustment of his own price.
The spread is influenced by two aspects: The fact that now also 
interbank traders can submit orders to a trader and not only customers 
implies a higher price sensitivity of those orders which will reduce the size 
of the spread. On the other hand, transactions uncertainty does increase 
since the volume of interbank transactions usually is bigger than customer 
transactions. A trader will try to protect himself against this increased 
uncertainty through a broadened spread. However, in general the spread 
under competition does diminish as compared to the monopoly case.
In the following we will build on Suvanto’s framework but leave out 
the presence of an interbank market in order to ease comparison of results 
with the monopoly case.
3 An n-Period D ynam ic M odel W ith  Com­
petition
The basic structure of the model presented here is similar to the monopoly 
set-up in Wuthe (1999). It differs in that now the local dealer has to face 
not only clients’ sensitivity towards his own price but also differences be­
tween his quotation and his competitors ones’. This construction is based 
on the assumption that customers are no longer constrained to trade in 
their local market only (a limitation which may be due to high transac­
tion or information costs e.g.). Occurring higher transaction costs when 
trading outside the local market a continuum of clients may be imagined 




























































































from the well-informed oil the one end to the noil-informed on the other 
end of the scale. The well-informed clients with low transaction costs can 
easily choose to leave the local market if they observe an only marginally 
better quotation elsewhere.- Another possibility for introducing compe­
tition is to assume the presence of many dealers in the same local market 
with customers differing in their degree of price sensitivity. 2
There are two different types of customers present in the market: One 
type - the HET type - is characterized by a high elasticity of net-supply, 
the other type - the LET type - by a low elasticity, all other parameters 
being equal between the two groups.
The two different arrival rates of customers’ demand in period t, x t, 
can be described as follows:
= a — cs“ — e (s“ — S“) ; 
x[ =  a -  dsat -  f  (s“ -  S“) , c > d, e > f.
with s“ being the monopolist’s ask-rate and the intercept a being equal 
for both types. The superscripts indicate which type’s demand is being 
described. Seen from the dealer’s perspective, customer demand is the 
same as arriving sell orders.
Competitors’ quotations are represented as the average quotation 
across all dealers in the market - 5 “ and Sb being the average ask- and 
bid-rates. The parameters e and /  describe the customers’ sensitivity 
to price differentials, with e being HETs’ higher parameter and /  LETs’ 
lower one. The bigger a positive bracket term the higher is the individual 
trader’s ask-rate relative to the average market ask-rate, and the lower
2An aspect from which we will abstract in this analysis is the real world presence of 
an interbank market: The interbank market is a market which allows the individual 
dealer to cover eventually open positions by trading with other dealers. Doing so 
the dealer acts in the role of a customer which will strengthen competition. The 
effect of this should be a narrowing of the spread, as was said above, but its effect 





























































































will be demand for foreign exchange from him. The contrary is true for 
a negative bracket term.- The parameters c and d, on the other hand, 
show customers’ seiisitivity, in the aggregate, to the exchange rate. If 
sensitivity to price differentials is high it can be assumed that e and /  
are large relative to c and d, respectively.
Market demand follows to be the sum of the two different demand 
curves weighted with the respective distributional weights if the number 
of low elasticity type costumers in the market is given by 1 — v, and the 
number of high elasticity type costumers by v:
x t = v • [a -  cs“ -  e (s“ -  5“)] + (1 -  v) ■ [a -  dsat -  /  (s“ -  S(°)].
Similarly, on the other side of the market the supply functions depend 
also oil HETs’ and LETs’ sensitivity to price differentials respectively:
Vt — b + csbt + e -  St'j ;
y‘t = b + dsb + f ( s b- S b) , c > d , e > f .
The bigger a positive bracket term the higher is the individual trader’s 
bid-rate relative to the average market bid-rate and the higher will be 
supply of foreign currency to him whereas the contrary holds for a neg­
ative bracket term.
Market Supply is then given by:
Vt = v • [h + csb + e (sj -  5?)j + (1 -  v) • [ft +  dsb + f  (sb -  S?)] .
It should be remembered that the market demand and supply func­
tions present average arrival rates of incoming orders rather than always 
present market orders. Once again, high levels of the shift variables a 
and l) represent high levels of demand and supply, respectively.
For every single trader it is assumed that the closed position con­
straint for the end of the trading day applies, i.e. every existing position 
has to be reversed during the remainder of the day. The dynamic opti­

































































































— Max Et {nt +  Jl+i [mt+i]} (value function) 
=  0 (terminal value)
= m t -  A + st - [qt -{6+ i]) + ( 1 -  qt) ■ (7 + p)] -  
St ■ [qt ■ t] + (1 — qt) ■ p\ (system constraint)
=  m* (terminal state constraint).
It is assumed that dealers are aware of there being two different types 
of clients present in the market, and that they know their demand and 
supply functions, i.e. all the respective parameters are known to them. 
However, the dealers have no information about the distribution of high 
and low elasticity clients, i.e. the value of the parameter v is unknown 
to them. For his maximization calculus they therefore have to use their 
subjective prior beliefs q about the true value v: The subjective belief qt 
is the belief each trader holds at the beginning of period t conditional on 
all information available up to that point of time.
Furthermore, dealers are constrained to have their expected foreign 
exchange positions closed by the end of the day, or to meet some other 
position target rn*. A position is said to be closed (squared) if the value 
of assets denominated in a given currency is equal the value of liabilities 
denominated in that currency; i.e. the dealers’ holdings of foreign curren­
cies are hedged against any unexpected change in the environment which 
determines the customers’ average buy and sell orders. Since for every 
foreign exchange transaction there are always two currencies involved a 
dealer’s position can be regarded as closed if net sales of these two curren­
cies are equal to zero by the end of the trading day (or whatever period 
under consideration).
The change in each trader’s foreign currency inventory, m. during 
one trading session can be described by the amount of net sales of that 
period:




























































































where m t is the inventory at the beginning of period t, and m t+1 is the 
inventory at the beginning of period t + 1 (which is the same as the 
inventory at the end of period t).
In order to describe the dealer’s maximization problem the ask- and 
the bid-rate are redefined in terms of the mid-rate and the half-spread: 
The mid-rate is given by st = js“ + s,] /2, and the half-spread by zt = 
[s“ — SjJ /2. The profit function of the dealer is then given by (using 
conventions A ■= a — 6 > 0, B = a + b > 0 ,6 =  2c > 0 ,7  = 2d > 0 , and 
j) = 2e,p = 2f):
nt = [<7t ■ +  (1 -  qt) ■ r'(] ■ s‘l -  [ q t - V t+ i l -  qt) ■ ?/!] ■ sbt
Qt ' {a — cs‘l — e (s“ — S“)) +
(1 -  (]t) ■ (a -  dsat -  /  (s“ -  S»))
qt - (b + csbt + e (sf -  +
(1 -  qt) ■ (b + ds\ + /  [sbt -  5,6))
=  Qt • [*( ■ (A + q ■ St) + zt • (B  + 11 ■ Zt) —  (6 + 7]) ■ (sj + zf +
(1 — qt) ‘ [•s( ■ (A + p ■ St) + zt ■ {B + p ■ Zt) — (7 + p) ■ (sf +  z(-)] .
In words: The trader’s profit of one period is given by the value difference 
between his foreign currency acquisitions and sales where the net supply 
quantities are weighted with the period’s belief about the population’s 
distribution, respectively.
Solving backward in time the sequential pricing rule and spread are 
obtained to be: 3
• (st + zt) ~
■ (St -  zt)
A + S f  [gt ■ 7) + (1 -  qt) ■ p\ 
qt ■ (6 + 7)) + ( 1  - q t) ■ (7 + p)
____________1____________
qt ■ (6 + v) +  ( 1  -< ? ()■  ( 7 +  p)
(m, -  m l) /  (T + 1 -  t ) ,




























































































B  +  fat -V +  (1 -  qt) ■ p] Zt 
2-[qt -{6 + i)) +  (1 -  qt) • (7 +  p)]'
The expression for the quotation can be split into two parts: The first 
one (up to the minus sign) is the one-period equilibrium rate which also 
depends directly 011 the average quotation in the market and, hence, also 
on other traders’ period beliefs. The second part describes the impact 
of an eventual open position a fraction of which shall be closed during 
the following periods. The mid-rate will be below the equilibrium rate 
if the current inventory positions falls short of the target, and it will be 
above in the opposite case. Note that the coefficient attached to the open 
position increases as t approaches the last trading session T. With a zero 
open position the mid-rate becomes equal to the one-period equilibrium 
rate.
Also the spread depends no longer on the individual dealer’s price 
making power as in the monopoly case but also on the average spread in 
the market. It thus fluctuates not only due to belief updates but also to 
period-to-period changes of other traders’ spread.
For the duopoly case the Nash-equilibrium solutions are obtained 
by replacing St and Z, with the respective opponent’s expressions and 
solving for st and zt:
sn.e. _  (A -  m t) ■ {[pt • {6 + q) + (1 -  p,) ■ (7 + p)] + fa, • g + (1 -  gt) ■ p]}
[Pt ■ (<5 + r/) + (1 -  Pi) • (7 +  P)\ - _ ]
' [9f(5 +  p) +  ( l - g t ) - ( 7  + P)] > • (T + 1 -  t)2
. [<7i ■ V + (1 -  <7() • P] • b>t ■ *) + (1 -  Pt) ■ p) J
B ■ {2 • [p, ■ (6 + g) + (1 -  pt) • (7 + p)\ + [qt ■ V + (1 ~ <?t) • p]} 
2 ( fat' (6 +  Vi) +  (1 -  qL) ■ (7 + p)] • I 
\  [Pf(<5 + P) + (1 - P t ) - ( 7  + p)] J 




























































































4 Learning and Belief-U pdating
In the course of the trading process traders use the indirect evidence from 
the order flow to infer what the value of the unknown parameter is. The 
learning problem is then solved via the application of specific learning 
rules.4
We specify as the information each trader receives a client’s reaction 
to his quoted price. At the beginning of each trading session traders quote 
bid- and ask-rates upon request. When a trader’s quotation gets rejected 
by a client the trader can infer that a HET client had been calling. In the 
monopoly case in Wuthe (1999) this procedure of information extraction 
had been motivated by the fact that the expected demand and supply 
curves always lie above the HET’s respective curves which renders the 
optimal quotation too high for a HET.
This interpretation becomes disputable in the present setting since 
it is no longer clear whether a quotation is rejected because of a HET 
calling or because of too high a price differential for a LET (who is able 
to call around and get an idea about the market average). However, the 
reaction to his quotations remains the trader’s only potential source of 
information in order to learn the population’s true distribution. In the 
following it is therefore assumed that the individual trader continues to 
interpret phone calls the same way as he would do as a monopolist.
After the interpretation of the outcome of the phone call the traders, 
at the end of each period, update their prior beliefs according to some 
updating rule. The resulting posterior then becomes their new prior. 
Observing new data in the following periods the updating process con­
tinues.
The choice of the updating rule is of considerable importance since 
the movement of beliefs over time is determined by it. The dynamics of 
the updating process and its convergence properties will be reflected in
4 In what follows we basically summarize the presentation and motivation of the 




























































































the movement of prices. Hence, knowing those properties of the learning 
rule allows to determine what aspects of price behavior follow from the 
nature of the learning rule, and which reflect other factors such as dealer- 
specific preferences or market structure constraints.
While all asymmetric-information microstructure models essentially 
solve a Bayesian learning model we propose here the application of less 
sophisticated learning rules. The reason for this procedure is that the 
chaotic and volatile behavior of intra-day exchange rates together with 
the negligible impact of news of minor importance 5 suggest the pos­
sibility of a less smooth learning process on behalf of the traders. As 
will be discussed further below applying less sophisticated learning rules 
does not necessarily imply a lower level of rationality. This argument 
is relevant in the context of a market where professional traders try to 
optimize their behavior in order to extract maximal profits.
Following the taxonomy of learning of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) 
we will make use of ’unsophisticated learning’ behavior as opposed to 
’sophisticated learning’. The rules associated with this type of learning 
are ’adaptive learning’ rules. I.e.: Individuals take decisions on the basis 
of past observations only. 6 We will concentrate on this type of learning 
behavior in the following and present three specific updating rules that 
fall into the class of adaptive learning behavior. The order of presenta­
tion is not by chance; the learning rules are chosen such as to require a 
decreasing level of sophistication.
’See Guillaume, D.M., M.M. Dacorogna and O.V. Pictet (1994a)
6Milgrom and Roberts (1991) define adaptive in the sense that every strategy 
played by a player must not violate a minimum rationality requirement with respect 
to opponents’ previous play. A sophisticated player, on the other hand, would also 




























































































4.1 F ictitiou s P lay
Fictitious play is a well known type of adaptive learning behavior. While 
originally introduced as a method of solving normal form games 7 it later 
on became applied in modeling learning processes.8 Its mathematical 
method is rather intuitive and simple: Taking the empirical frequencies of 
opponents’ past strategies agents are supposed to learn about the future 
choices of their opponents. Translating this concept into the context of 
our model the updating algorithm, basically, is of the following shape:
Prob(Acpt)(T + 1) =  YS.Acptt)/T,
t
where Acpt refers to a client’s acceptance of the quote. In words: The 
probability of next period’s customer being a LET type is equal to the 
sum of all acceptances up until now over the total number of periods.9
Being backward-looking only an important characteristic of this learn­
ing rule is its long memory: The set of all past events is perfectly recalled 
and influences each new probability calculation. The longer history lasts 
the less weight a single new event attains. This leads to a smoothen- 
ing of the series of frequencies over time. In the limit, as T  —* oo the 
Prob(Acpt)(T) converges to the true parameter value v.
4.2 E volutionary P lay
Evolutionary play is a theoretical approach that is being used for prob­
lems of equilibrium selection and justification in games. Typically, evolu­
tionary models are not considered as describing proper learning processes
'See Brown (1951), Robinson (1951).
8For examples of applications see e g. Fudenberg-Kreps (1993 a. 1995). However, 
they justify ficticious play in terms of Baysean learning (Fudenberg-Kreps (1993)) 
which is not the line of argument we are persuing here.
9 An explicit specification of initial move properties is omitted here, but will be 




























































































since no specific learning rule is introduced. Yet, through the evolution­
ary process some sort of learning is taking place.10 In the context of 
adaptive learning it has to be noticed, however, that in evolutionary 
models opponents change at each stage which renders the record of past 
plays noil-homogenous.
In our model with competing traders evolutionary learning is applied 
ill the following way: Two different groups of traders will play against 
each other using different strategies or learning rules respectively. Ac­
cording to each groups’ relative success members will then switch to 
another group. Increments of adjustment are given.
The two strategies the groups will make use of are fictitious play 
and simplistic learning (which will be described in the following section); 
i.e. the most and the least sophisticated learning rules on our scale are 
going to play against each other. Convergence should occur if one of the 
strategies is dominant. The speed of convergence depends on the change 
of weights given to each strategy. However, if the change is too rapid the 
end of game coidd be reached too quickly, i.e. before one strategy really 
has proven to be fitter in the long-run.
4.3 S im plistic Learning
The third learning rule we introduce is the least sophisticated one. In 
fact, the rule reveals little insight on behalf of an agent in a learning pro­
cess’ sensitivity to the degree of adjustments being used in the updating 
process. It is for this reason that we call it ’’simplistic” . It is introduced 
here as a reference point at the lower end of the scale of sophistication.
The simplistic rule simply says, depending on the last observation, 
to adjust one’s belief half the distance between the belief currently held
10For a discussion of the connections between learning and evolution see Selten 




























































































and the maximum (minimum) parameter value possible. I.e.:
To be more specific, if in our model a trader meets a high elasticity 
type (HET) (=no deal took place) he increases qlt his subjective prior 
belief about the fraction of HET in the market, by
, 1 -<?i
92 = 9 1 +  —
91 + 1
2 ’
if he met a low elasticity type (LET) he decreases q\ such that
The same happens at the end of each period.
It is obvious that with this learning behavior belief revisions take place 
in relatively big jumps. With a series of equal observations (i.e. accep­
tances or rejections only) beliefs quickly adjust towards the respective 
extreme points. One contrasting observation, instead, makes the new 
belief immediately jump to the vicinity of the opposite extreme. This 
jump will be the bigger the closer the last prior has been to the other 
extreme point. While giving such a big weight to the last observation 
renders this learning process extremely volatile and noil-convergent its 
expected value, however, converges to the true parameter value:
* ( * ) « ■ * • ( £ * )  +  £




























































































5 Single Trading Day Simulations
5.1 T he Sim ulation  Setup
As in the monopoly case in Wuthe (1999) the dynamic simulation system 
consists of three periods for the shorter trading day. At the end of the 
day any open position has to be closed. Several traders are now present 
in the market. They differ in their subjective prior beliefs which are 
generated in the following way: q(i) = i/N . I.e.: Each trader’s i prior is 
equal to the ith fraction of the total number of traders N  present in the 
market.
As for the computation of the average quotation of the market - 
against which everybody is playing - each trader is initially given the 
same arbitrary value which stands for the average quotation. With this 
value all traders’ mid-rates are then determined. I.e.: Each trader is 
playing against this arbitrary average value. The resulting quotations 
are then taken to compute a new market average for the mid-rate which, 
in a new loop, replaces the initial value. This process is repeated until 
it converges to a stationary value for the average market mid-rate - In 
order to compute the Nash equilibrium of the duopoly case the same 
procedure is being applied: The number of traders reduces to N  = 2 
and the average market value is defined as the average of both players’ 
mid-rate.
The above described computations should not be confused with the 
simulation of the learning process: Each trader’s updating takes place at 
the beginning of each period, following the mechanics lined out above. 
Only then, with this period’s new belief, the quotations are determined 
in dependence on the market average quotation.
As for the single-day simulations three different variance measures 
have been used: The first one computes the variance of all possible third 
period quotations of one single trader (VET). This measure corresponds 




























































































rect comparison of results. The second measure computes the variance 
between all traders’ differing third period quotations (VAT). This out-of- 
sample computation is being done for every possible history of events. 
I.e.: With this method there are as many variances computed as there 
are possible histories. The third and last measure is the out-of-sample 
variance of all traders’ quotations of all periods (VAAT). Being an out- 
of-sample measure once again there are as many possible outcomes as 
there are histories.
For reasons of comparability the parameters’ ceteris paribus values 
are identical to the monopoly case, i.e.:
a = 2, d = 1.2, g = 0.6, v = 0.4, ql = 0.5.
As for the two new parameters of LET’S and HET’s sensitivity to 
price differentials the ceteris paribus values are as follows:
7/ = 5, p — 0.9.
(Later simulations will give a justification of this choice.)
5.2 V olatility  Behavior w ith  D ifferent D egrees o f 
C om petition
The first set of simulations deals with the impact of different degrees of 
competition. For this purpose the number of traders has been varied 
while all other parameter values remained constant. The simulations 
start with the duopoly case, the number of traders is then increased up 
to six. This maximum number is relatively low but computational effort 
grows exponentially with every additional trader: With six traders the 
number of possible histories amounts already to 22'N = 4096. The results, 
however, reveal a clear trend.
With the presence of competition a trader whose quotation has been 
rejected cannot be sure anymore for which reason this has happened: 
Was it because a HET client had called, or was it because a LET client 
had called for whom the mid-rate was too high relative to the market 




























































































riddle he has to make up his own rule of interpretation with subsequently 
differing updating behavior. In the following simulations the impact 
of such different rules on the spot-rate’s volatility has been taken into 
consideration.
Case 1: Same U pdating  Behavior As In  the  M onopoly Case 
In this first simulation over the number of traders it is assumed that 
each trader does his updating as if there was no competition. I.e., if 
his quotation becomes rejected on the phone he will believe that a HET 
client called - although there is the possibility that his quotation became 
rejected by a LET client who found his quotation too high relative to the 
market average. The advantage of this interpretation for our purposes 
is that it eases comparisons with the monopoly simulation results where 
updating followed the same rule.
O bservation 1 The variance of all possible third period quotations (VET) 
is continuously decreasing in the number of traders. It remains ex­
cessive, though, for the whole spectrum of 2 to 6 traders.
The mean and the upper limit of the range of VAT (the variance 
between all traders’ differing third period quotations) is increasing 
in the number of traders. Excess volatility is negative for a majority 
part of histories, but this part is becoming smaller with growing 
competition.
Contrasting, the mean and the upper limit of the range of VAAT 
(the variance of all traders’ quotations of all periods) is decreasing 
with a higher degree of competition. Although the range’s lower 
limit is slightly groining the percentage of histories with positive 
excess volatility is declining.
In the first graph the variances of each trader’s possible third period 
quotations (VET) are depicted as small circles - each circle representing 




























































































Variances Of Each Traders Possible 3rd Period Quotations
Number of traders in the market
Figure 1:
traders in the market, i.e. the degree of competition is measured. The 
range of VET values is continuously decreasing in the number of traders, 
but bands do overlap. I.e., in a market with five traders one trader’s 
VET can be higher than another trader’s VET in a market with three 
traders only. However, one and the same trader’s VET is continuously 
decreasing with tenser competition. Furthermore, the smaller a trader’s 
prior belief the higher is his variance. The explanation for this observa­
tion is rather intuitive: A trader with a small prior believes that a small 
fraction of HETs only is present in the market. The range and mean of 




























































































The decrease in VET is continuous but diminishingly so. Throughout 
this simulation excess volatility remains positive. From the results it is 
not obvious whether and where the VET values would cross the funda­
mentals (dashed line) or whether excess volatility would converge and 
remain positive at an infinite degree of competition.
Why is volatility decreasing with this variance measure? This out­
come may seem surprising at first sight: In the quotation’s graph - where 
maximum and minimum values are represented as grey circles, the mean 
of all possible quotations as black circles instead - it can be seen that with 
a growing number of traders the mean and the extreme quotations are 
both increasing (the range of quotations is widening since the increase of 
the lower bound values is less strong than the upper ones), suggesting an 
increase in VET. However, it must be remembered that with six traders 
the number of possible histories is 4096, but with, say, three traders 
only 64 histories are possible. With more histories there are more values 
very close to each other which reduces the weight of the more extreme 
quotations and lowers thus the variance.
The out-of-sample variance VAT (see graph above) is increasing in 
competition. While the lower bound of VAT’s range remains constant at 
0.0002 its upper bound and mean are growing in a decreasing fashion:
Mean(VAT) = {0.0055; 0.0085; 0.0102; 0.0114; 0.0122} ,
where entries are respective to the five different degrees of competition.
The mean lies below the fundamentals’ value always. But the per­
centage of histories with positive excess volatility is growing with the 
number of traders.- How can this result be explained? The VAT val­
ues are considerably smaller than the VET ones since VAT is a measure 
which computes the variance between outcomes of a Nash equilibrium. In 
a competitive context a Nash equilibrium tends to pull results together. 
However, with a growing number of traders more contrasting quotation 
constellations are possible, depending on the beliefs the traders hold. 





































































































Variance Between The Diff. Traders 3rd Period Quotations
Variance Between The Diff. Traders Quotations Of All Periods
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Figure 2:
The picture becomes reversed looking at the out-of-sample variance 
of all observable quotations of one entire day, VAAT. Here, the mean and 
the range’s upper limit is decreasing with a higher degree of competition, 
in a diminishing fashion:
Mean(V A AT) = {0.0443: 0.0341; 0.0292; 0.0264; 0.0245} .
Mean-volatility is excessive throughout; for every number of traders 
in the market volatility is excessive for the majority of possible equilibria. 





























































































Share(VAAT > Fund) = {0.6250; 0.6562; 0.6250; 0.5645; 0.5159}.
Where does the difference between VAT and VAAT stem from? While 
it is true that customers’ sensitivity to price differentials minimizes the 
impact of traders’ different beliefs on their quotations within one period 
the same does not hold for price differences between periods: Changing 
beliefs from one period to another are reflected in different levels of 
quotations. In a new period the different traders’ quotations will again 
be very similar to one another but now on a new level (since beliefs are 
different from the previous period). Thus, considering all periods of one 
trading day (VAAT), the quotations’ variance should be considerably 
higher than the variance of one single period only (VAT).
VAAT’s decrease with stronger competition is due to the growing sam­
ple size which reduces the weight of extreme values: For two traders there 
are six quotations observed over an entire trading day, for six traders, 
instead, there are already eighteen observations.- In the case of VAT 
the number of observations increases from to two to six only which is 
not sufficient to outweigh the variance increasing impact of the more 
and more extreme quotation-constellations which become possible with 
tenser competition.
Case 2: W ith  Two Rejections A LET M ust Have Called The 
Second Tim e In this case traders are aware that their quotation may 
have been rejected by a LET client who found the price too high relative 
to the market average. They include this possibility in their updating 
behavior by assuming that a second rejection during one day must be 
attributed to a LET client. I.e.: While a first rejection leads to an 
increase in the believed share of HETs in the market the opposite is true 





























































































O bservation 2 All three variance measures react in the same fashion 
to an increase in competition as in Case 1. The magnitude of VET 
and VAT, however, is relatively lower. In the case of VAT this leads 
to more cases of negative excess volatility.
The mean size of VAAT is bigger which implies more instances of 
positive excess volatility.
Variances Of Each Traders Possible 3rd Period Quotations
Number of traders in the market
Figure 3:
A look at the 3rd period quotations graph helps explaining these ob­
servations: As could be expected from the new updating rule there are 




























































































2nd period phone calls the traders will believe that a LET client has 
called. In fact the quotations’ mean moves up by around 1/10th. Fur­
thermore, the lower value of their interval is higher while the upper one 
did not change so that the length of the interval is shortened altogether. 
VET becomes thus smaller than in a situation with a broader range of 
quotations: While quotations’ maximum peaks are similar to the ones of 
Case 1 minimum values are higher. More important, the distribution of 
quotations is smoother since many histories are identical: All those when 
a HET called a second time with the ones when a HET called the first 
time and a LET the second time. Overall this leads to a lower variance 
of all possible third period quotations. Excess volatility remains positive 
in this simulation though (or equal to zero in one case).
As well the VAT graph looks similar to the respective graph of Case 
1 but moves on a lower scale. The mean values of VAT are increasing in 
the number of traders but are around 1/4th smaller:
mean(VATcasei) = {0.0037; 0.005G; 0.0067; 0.0074; 0.0080} 
mean{VATcasei) = {0.0055; 0.0085; 0.0102; 0.0114; 0.0122}.
And while the minimum values of VAT do hardly differ between the two 
cases maximum values are around 1/4th lower this time:
inax(VM7co«2) = {0.0180; 0.0228; 0.0235; 0.0247; 0.0259}
Iliax(VATcasei) = {0.0246; 0.0316;0.0329;0.0336;0.0355}.
The range of the VAT values is thus shortened from above which, once 
again, can be attributed to the smaller distance between the quotations’ 
extreme values and their smoother distribution. Consequently there are 
relatively more cases of negative excess volatility.
As for the ranges of VAAT the upper values are identical for the two 
cases, the lower ones do not differ significantly. The mean, however, is 
higher by around l/5 th  than in Case 1:
Mean(V A ATcasei) = {0.0549; 0.0419; 0.0355; 0.0317; 0.0293}
































































































Variance Between The Diff. Traders 3rd Period Quotations
Variance Between The Diff. Traders Quotations Of All Periods
Number of traders in the market
Figure 4:
which implies more cases of positive excess volatility:
Share(VAATcasd > Fund) =  {0.7500; 0.7500; 0.6641; 0.6953; 0.6665} 
Share{VAATCasei > Fund) = {0.6250; 0.6562; 0.6250; 0.5645; 0.5159} .
This outcome is once again due to the updating process: In Case 
1 two rejections with the respective updating lead to an always lower 
quotation. But the difference between period 1 and period 2 quotations 
is bigger than the one between period 2 and period 3. This is so since the 
updating process halfens an always smaller distance between the current 




























































































only). In Case 2, instead, a second rejection leads to a much bigger jump 
of the quotation in the opposite direction since a relatively high belief now 
becomes halfened towards zero. The range of the observed quotations 
and their mean becomes thus higher. Consequently, the mean of VAAT 
increases with the number of those cases in which a second rejection is 
interpreted as a LET client calling.
Case 3: A Rejection Of The First Quotation means That A LET 
Has Called, For Period Three Everything Remains Equal To 
Case 1 Again the traders are aware of the possibility that a LET client 
can reject their quotation. But its integration in the updating process 
is different now in that a rejection of the first quotation is interpreted 
as a LET client phone call. A second rejection or a first rejection in the 
second period, instead, are interpreted as a rejection from a HET client.
Observation 3 The new Tipdating rule does not change the direction of 
competition’s impact on the different variance measures but only 
their magnitude. VET is slightly smaller than in Case 1. Excess 
volatility remains positive throughout.
While the range of VAT is almost identical to Case 2 its mean 
is slightly bigger - however, the number of cases of positive excess 
volatility is smaller.
V A A T ’s mean is higher than in the first two cases. There are no 
instances of negative excess volatility at all.
With the new updating rule every trader will believe in a bigger num­
ber of LET clients at the beginning of period 2, no matter whether his 
previous period quotation was accepted or rejected. Period 2 quotations 
will thus be higher than before. Only in period three price movements in 
the opposite direction are possible. As a consequence third period quo­
tations can never be as low as in Case 1. While maximum and minimum 




























































































up again and lies even higher than in Case 2. Obviously the reason for 
this observation is that there are more possibilities to reach at a low 3rd 
period belief - and hence a high quotation - with the 2nd period belief 
always being below the prior than with a 2nd period belief which some­
times exceeds the prior (a subsequent belief then can never become as 
low as with two updates in the same directions).
Variances Of Each Traders Posable 3rd Period Quotations
Number of traders in the martet
Figure 5:
The updating rule has a dampening effect on VET: Its curve lies 
slightly below the one of Case 1 but is notably higher than in Case 2. 
The explanation for this result is simple: As in Case 2 there are now 




























































































quotations at the lower end of the possible range can only take on less 
extreme values. The VET values of Case 3 are closer to the ones of Case 
1 since the quotations’ mean is higher than in the previous case.- Excess 
volatility in the current simulation remains strictly positive.
Looking at the VAT measure it is not surprising to see that contrary 
to Case 2 the new updating rule leads to a higher mean, exceeding even 
the one of Case 1 by 1/10th:
mean (V ATCaae3) = {0.0065; 0.0098; 0.0117; 0.0130; 0.0138} 
mean{VATcasei) =  {0.0055; 0.0085; 0.0102; 0.0114; 0.0122}
This, once again, can be explained by the 3rd period quotations’ higher 
mean. However, the share of constellations with positive excess volatility 
here is higher in two instances only, for three and four traders:
Share(V ATCasc3 > Fxind) = {0.0000; 0.1250; 0.1250; 0.0938; 0.0781} 
Share(VATcasei > Fund) =  {0.0625; 0.0938; 0.1016; 0.1123; 0.1123}
This result is due to the higher VAT-peaks that are possible in Case 1 
with the original updating rule which implied a wider quotations interval.
VAAT, the out-of-sample variance of all traders’ all period quotations, 
has a significantly higher mean than the two previous cases, and excess 
volatility is always positive. This outcome is due to the updating rule 
which leads to only one single possible 2nd period quotation, the highest 
one possible, since all traders update their beliefs in the direction of a 
higher share of LET clients in the market. VAAT can thus never take 
on values as low as in the first two cases while the range’s upper limit 
does not change. As a result excess volatility is always positive for the 
present parameter constellation; even at its lowest value at N  — 6 traders 
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Figure 6:
5.3 V olatility  B ehavior under C hanging Param eter  
Values
The Impact of the Size of the HET’s and LET’S Parameter of 
Sensitivity to Price-differentials e and r  In order to choose ceteris 
paribus values for the two parameters of sensitivity to price differentials 
both have been simulated simultaneously: The Het parameter of sensi­
tivity, e, takes on values between 5 and 60, the LET parameter, r, values 





























































































O bservation 4 For all realizations of e the quotations are falling in the 
LET parameter r . Contrasting, quotations are growing in the HET 
parameter e.- The variance measure VET is falling in r but growing 
in the HET parameter e when r > 0.5. Excess volatility is always 
positive for the present parameter values.
VAT is falling in both parameters - the stronger in e the smaller is 
r.- VAAT, too, is continuously falling in r, the stronger the smaller 
is e. But it is growing in e. Excess volatility, in the case of VAT, 
is positive only for small values of e and r. In the case of VAAT 
the picture is different: Excess volatility is falling in r but growing 
in e.
It should be noted that for dimensional reasons the quotations’ graph 
as well as VAT and VAAT are represented for one specific history only, 
namely history 28 of trader 1. This history has been chosen since it 
leads to average sized quotations and variances and, at the same time, 
exhibits an interesting feature of the quotations. It is characterized by 
the following telephone experiences of the three traders in the first and 
second period, respectively:
Oil in period 1
Oil in period 2.
I.e. trader 1 experienced two acceptances while the other two traders’ 
quotations were rejected in each of the first two periods.
One would expect quotations to fall in both parameters under con­
sideration but interestingly this is not the case for all possible history 
constellations. While for, say, the extreme case of rejections only the 
quotations’ behavior is perfectly ’normal’, here and for most other histo­
ries quotations are increasing rather than falling in e, HET’s parameter of 
sensitivity to price differentials. The intuition for this surprising outcome 
is the following: A trader who has experienced two acceptances believes 




























































































quote relative high a price. But the higher his quotations are the more he 
minimizes his chances to make a deal with a HET client. This is true the 
more the higher is HET’s sensitivity to price differentials. Thus, for our 
trader it is perfectly rational to quote an even higher price when HET’s 
sensitivity is higher since the likelihood to make a deal with this type of 
client is so small that it pays to raise the price and have an even bigger 
profit in case a LET client calls.- Note that for the two other traders 
of this history quotations are also increasing in e but doing so for small 
values of r as well. The reason is that believing in a higher presence of 
HETs in the market quotations are already relatively low even if LETs 
parameter r  is very small.
The first graph shows VET, the variance of all possible third period 
quotations (of the first trader only for clarity of exposition) and the 
fundamentals’ variance which is given by the lower plane. The latter 
variance is not dependent on e or r and remains invariant. VET is 
decreasing in r  and growing in e for r > 0.5. The shape of VET reflects 
the quotations’ behavior, i.e. falling in r and for the majority of histories 
growing in e when r  is bigger than some number. Excess volatility is 
significantly positive always for the present set of parameter values.
As for VAT a continuous decrease in both parameters can be observed. 
This is true although quotations are increasing in e since all three traders’ 
quotations behave in a very similar way. The biggest differences are 
observable for small values of r  and e: Here, as has been described above, 
trader 1 quotes relatively high prices whereas the other two traders start 
out with relatively low quotations. With increasing parameter values 
quotations tend to become more and more similar.- Excess volatility is 
thus present for small values of e and r  only.
VAAT as well is falling in r  but growing in e. This difference stems 
from the nature of this variance measure: Looking at all periods the 
quotations’ growing size in e weighs more than one period differences 
between relatively low quotations.- Excess volatility thus grows in the 

































































































Variance Of A Traders Posable 3rd Penod Quotations
3rd Penod Quotations Of Trader 1
Figure 7:
ease and it is present for more parameter constellations.
As for the following simulations ceteris paribus values have been cho­
sen that lie in a range which is sensitive to small variations and that 
are small enough to guarantee some instances of excess volatility. The 
parameters will be fixed at the following levels: e = 5 and r  = 0.9.
The Impact of the Size of the Intercept 7l In this simulation the 
intercept is taking on values between 1 and 5. All remaining parameter 































































































Excess Volatility Between The Diti. Traders 3rd Period Quotations
Figure 8:
O bservation 4 All three variance meastires are increasing in the inter­
cept as are the quotations. Volatility of VET is excessive - as was 
the case for the monopolist - except at A = 1. However, the vari­
ances are only half as big and their increase is less steep than in 
the former case.
Excess volatility of VAT is in most of the cases negative and can 
become extremely high for low values of A.
VAAT's excess volatility is almost always positive, except at A = 1, 




























































































fundamentals' variance more than 31 times.




VET is continuously increasing in the intercept A, the shape of its 
curve being similar to the one of the monopoly case. Its increase, however, 
is less steep than without competition and its scale is more than halfened. 
As a result at A = 1 the variance lies below the fundamentals’ one. With 
tenser competition excess volatility can thus become negative even with 
a bigger trading volume (A > 1).- Here as in the monopoly case the VET 
curves’ increase is due to the quotations’ continuous increase which leads 





























































































VAT is increasing in the quotations and, hence, in the volume of 
trade. History-to-history differences in the magnitude of VAT become 
more pronounced when the quotations are higher. E.g.: History 28 leads 
to the maximum variance for all parameter values for A. But the max­
imum values grow considerably with the intercept: At A = 1 VAT is 
equal to 0.0079 while at A =  5 the variance equals 0.1976 which exceeds 
the fundamentals’ variance almost twenty times (Var(Fund) =  0.0216). 
A closer look at the 3rd period quotations reveals that VAT has its max­
imum at history 28: This extreme quotation constellation (the history 
profile is given by two rejections for two traders: 011 for period 1 and Oil 
for period 2) becomes enlarged enormously with growing A and, hence, 
growing rates.
Excess volatility is always negative or equal to zero for A < 3. For 
some histories VAT then exceeds the fundamentals’ variance. But when 
most of the traders were rejected twice excess volatility remains negative 
even at A = 5
VAAT as well is increasing in the intercept. At A = 1 all possi­
ble VAAT realizations - apart from the very first one - lie below the 
fundamentals’ variance. But excess volatility is less negative than for 
VAT and becomes immediately positive for almost all histories when 
A > 1, exceeding the fundamentals by far. VAAT’s mean at A = 3 
equals Mearlyaat = 0.0768, at A = 5 it reaches Mearlyaat = 0.2133.
The VAAT graph repeats the movements of the 2nd period quotations 
and tends to be high where the 2nd period quotations are high and thus 
more distant to the 1st period ones. These relative peaks of VAAT are 
further enforced or dampened by corresponding high variances of the 3rd 
period quotations.
The different size of VAT and VAAT has already been explained in 
the description of Case 1: VAAT measures the variance of prices whose 
































































































Excess Volatility Between The Off. Traders 3rd Period Quotations




The Im pact of the Size of the  H E T ’s P aram eter of P rice Sen­
sitiv ity  d In this simulation the parameter d takes on values between 
0.7 and 4 as in the monopoly case. All other parameter values remain 
fixed at their ceteris paribus values.
O bservation 5 The. VET curves - first slightly increasing in d and then 
slowly decreasing again - are fairly fiat compared to the monopoly 
case. Excess volatility is, thus, present for low values of d only.
The VAT and VAAT curves are both continuously increasing in d. 




























































































in d excess volatility is positive in some instances only, when d is 
small. It then becomes highly negative.
0 0.5 t 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
d - HET parameter ol price sensitivity
3rd Period Quotations
60 50 40 30 20  10
History
Figure 11:
3rd period quotations decrease with an increasing price sensitivity of 
HET clients. But the distance between the possible realizations and their 
mean is growing with a growing difference between the HET’s and LET’s 
price sensitivity. In other words: With increasing d the quotations range 
widens considerably.
The VET curve (its shape has already been analyzed in the respective 




























































































is lowered and flattened by competition which allows for 64 rather than 
4 different histories. Consequently, the fundamentals’ variance exceeds 
VET now already at parameter values of d € {1.8; 2.3} rather than at 
d = 3 in the absence of competition.
For most of the histories VAT is continuously increasing in the HET 
parameter of price sensitivity. For small values of d the minimum values 
of VAT are very close to zero. Maximum values of VAT are quickly 
increasing and reach their peak with 0.1221 at d =  4. Excess volatility, 
however, realizes small positive values only for d < 1.4 and is then quickly 
becoming highly negative. This behavior is due to the fundamentals’ 
strong increase in d that has been depicted in the VET graph. (Note 
that the d-axis in the VAT and VAAT graphs show the three numbers 
0,2,4 only where the latter number is d's maximum value.)
VAAT is first increasing in d and then, for some histories, decreasing 
again. For all parameter values the smallest variance realization never 
exceeds 0.0089. Maxima of VAAT grow with the parameter and reach 
their highest value at d = 2.7 with 0.2039.- The fundamentals’ variance, 
on the other hand, again quickly exceeds VAAT; for d > 2.4 excess 
volatility is negative for all histories. It reaches its negative peak below 
-0.65.
The Impact of the Size of the LET’S Parameter of Price Sensi­
tivity g The parameter g has been simulated here with values ranging 
from 0.1 to 1.1. All other parameters stayed fix at their ceteris paribus 
level.
Observation 6 The VET curves are strongly decreasing in g as in the 
monopoly case. But initial values are considerably smaller than 
beforehand. The fundamentals ’ variance is relatively small and its 
decrease flatter in g. Excess volatility, thus, is decreasing sharply 
































































































Excess Volatility Between The Dilf. Traders3rd Period Quotations
History
Figure 12:
The VAT curves are also continuously decreasing in g. But initial 
values can be relatively high befoiv. they start falling sharply. VAAT 
follows the same pattern with initial values being extremely high. 
Excess volatility for both variance measures can be positive for low 
values of g but turns negative then for most of the histories.
As has been discussed in the monopoly case quotations differ between 
histories the more the bigger is the difference between the LET and HET 
parameter, i.e. the lower is g for a given d. When both parameters are 
equal quotations do not differ any more. Furthermore, quotations fall 




























































































Variances 01 Each Traders Posable 3rd Period Quotations
History
Figure 13:
Thus, as in the monopoly case, VET is sharply falling in g although 
competition flattens the curve considerably. Excess volatility initially is 
extremely high, falls quickly, and is then equal to zero at g = 1.1 for the 
two traders with the higher prior beliefs and close to zero for the third 
trader.
When LET’s parameter is very small and the distance to the HET 
parameter big then the impact of differing histories on 3rd period quota­
tions is huge. VAT reaches here a maximum of 0.3733, but at the same 
time, with similar histories it can become as small as 0.00056. VAT then 




























































































also history-to-history differences almost completely disappear - For high 
values of VAT excess volatility is positive and sometimes very high, but 
for low ones it can already be negative at g = 0.1. Interestingly, excess 
volatility is then increasing in g (although remaining negative) since the 
fundamentals’ variance decline is faster than the one of VAT. On the 
other hand, if initial values of VAT are high, first, a strong decline can 
be observed which then changes into a small increase for the same reason 
(excess volatility remaining negative here as well).
History
Figure 14:
The decrease of VAAT is even more dramatic. At the smallest value 




























































































VAT by far. The size of VAAT is due to the possible strong increases of 
quotations over one trading day which is reflected in this measure since it 
takes account of all three periods. Its values are highest where 3rd period 
quotations are very high, i.e. for the first history constellations where all 
traders believe in a small market presence of HETs and quotations are 
very high, hence.
Initially, excess volatility is extremely high and becomes negative for 
small values of VAAT only. Its decrease changes into a small increase 
when values of g are high. But for no history constellation it turns 
positive again.
The Im pact of the  Real D istribu tion  of the Population  v In this 
simulation the parameter v takes on values between 0 and 1. All other 
parameter values remain fixed at their ceteris paribus levels.
O bservation 7 The shape of the VET curves is identical to the one of 
the monopohj case. Volatility is excessive as long as both types of 
clients are present in the market.
Since quotations do not differ with the distribution parameter v 
the variance measures VAT and VAAT do not vary with changing 
parameter values. Excess volatility, though, changes proportionally 
reversed with the fundamentals ’ variance and has thus its minimum 
atv = 0.5 for both variance measures. As for VAT it is negative for 
most of the history constellations. The contrary holds for VAAT.
The quotations themselves are unaffected by a change in v. Only 
the variance VET is influenced by changes in the probability weight. Its 
three curves have a similar shape as in the monopoly case, but they are 
rescaled to around l/'3rd of that size and their maximum has moved to 
the right: It is at the point where the fundamentals’ variance reaches 
its maximum too, at v = 0.5, the point of equal distribution of HET 
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maximum here since the possible sequences of histories are the same for 
all of them. The difference in the curves height stems solely from the 
different subjective priors.
Since VET’s increase is stronger than the fundamentals one excess 
volatility reaches its maximum at v = 0.5, too.
The variances VAT and VAAT do not change with v since they are 
out-of-sample measures which are not affected by the size of the prob­
ability weight. The respective excess volatility measures thus change 
reversed proportionally with the fundamentals’ variance: When the lat­
































































































Excess Volatility Between The Diff. Traders 3rd Period Quotations
History
Figure 1G:
small size of VAT volatility here is almost always negatively excessive 
while with respect to VAAT it remains positive for most of the history 
constellations.
5.4 C onclusions o f th e  Single Trading D ay Sim ula­
tions
The foregoing simulations showed that the impact of increasing compe­
tition on volatility is not a clear one: Depending on which measure of 




























































































price volatility can be everything between negligibly small and strongly 
positive. Although surprising at first sight this result is quite intuitive: 
On the one hand side a growing number of traders, each with a dif­
ferent subjective prior, allows for a growing number of possible history 
constellations and therefore quotations for each trader. Depending on 
which beliefs traders hold in a given period - which are a function of 
their respective histories - a trader’s quotation will be a different one 
each time. The number of possible constellations in every period thus 
grows exponentially with the number of traders. This effect becomes 
more than outweighed, though, by the growing number of similar history 
constellations. Volatility, measured by the variance of a trader’s possible 
quotations , thus decreases with growing competition.
On the other hand, volatility measured empirically over all quotations 
of a single period increases with competition since a growing number of 
traders allows for more quotation constellations where individual histories 
differ significantly. (Imagine, e.g., some traders experiencing HET calls 
only over a longer number of periods, others LET calls only, and still 
another group some experience in between those.)
Expanding the variance measure to comprise all quotations of all peri­
ods, again, the growing sample size is more than outweighing the impact 
of more extreme quotation constellations, and volatility is decreasing in 
competition.
As for the different parameters’ impact on the variance measures the 
findings have been similar to the monopoly case.
6 Analysis of the System ’s Long-run B e­
havior with C om petition
In this section increasing competition’s impact on volatility in the long 
run is investigated. I.e.: We want to see how the different volatility mea­




























































































differs from learning rule to learning rule. However, the learning process 
itself is not influenced by the presence of competition since for his updat­
ing each trader takes into consideration his personal phone experiences 
only. Volatility, then, can change as a result of different quotation levels 
due to different degrees of competition and/or due to the construction of 
the different variance measures.
All results of the following three sections stem from simulations of 
1000 trading days. Every learning rule has been simulated with 2, 3, 
and 5 traders in the market. The resulting volatilities under the three 
different variance measures are presented in a summarized way, i.e. as 
the Mean of the respective 1000 variances. As for the monopolist the 
variance measure introduced in Wuthe (1999) is being used. Parameter 
values stayed fixed at their ceteris paribus values.
6.1 V olatility  B ehavior and C onvergence w ith  Sim ­
p listic  Learning
In this set of simulations each trader is using the above defined learning 
rule of simplistic updating. More specifically, use is made of the variation 
presented in Case 1 of the previous section: I.e. in his updating process 
the trader does not take into consideration the possibility that a rejection 
may have come from a LET client for whom his quotation was too high 
relative to the market average.- The traders’ initial beliefs are given by 
the fraction l / N,  one over the number of traders in the market. The 
monopolist’s prior belief is given by 1/2.
The results of the simulation set are presented in the following table. 
On the left the different variance measures and the means of 3rd period 
quotations are listed. As for the first variance measure there is one row 
for each trader’s respective outcome. The columns indicate the degree 
of competition, reaching from the monopolist case up to 5 traders in 
the market. The table construction implies that for the first variance 




























































































etc.. Means of 3rd period quotations are listed in the same fashion.- All 
reported numbers are means over the 1000 days vectors of the respective 
variance measures or quotations.
By construction beliefs never converge with this updating rule as has 
been demonstrated earlier. However, the different volatility measures 
now exhibit trends due to competition’s impact. The first measure re­
ported in the table, the variance of a single trader’s quotations of all 
periods of one trading day, does not correspond directly to VET of the 
previous section but has been chosen for comparability reasons with the 
monopolist.
The variance of a single trader’s quotations of all periods of one trad­
ing day is continuously decreasing in competition where the downward 
movement is the steepest between the monopoly and duopoly cases and 
then slowly becomes flatter. Differences between different traders are 
negligible and do not show any specific pattern. This is not surprising 
considering the number of simulated trading days which renders insignif­
icant any potential impact of differing priors.
The variance between all traders’ all period quotations of one day - 
which corresponds to the VAAT measure from the previous section - is 
diminishingly decreasing in competition as well. The variance between 
all traders’ 3rd period quotations, instead, - corresponding to VAT - is 
growing in competition.
These results should not be surprising. In terms of trend of competi­
tion’s impact they seem to confirm the observations of Case 1. Running a 
simulation over 1000 trading days should result in something close to the 
mean of all possible out-of-sample-variances which have been reported 
there. It seems striking, however, that here the mean values of all ob­
served variances and quotations are considerably higher than they are 
there, although parameter values are fixed to the same ceteris paribus 
values. The explanation for this riddle lies in the value at which the pa­
rameter of the true distribution of the population has been fixed: v =  0.4. 




























































































grain’s respective random device has been designed accordingly. Since on 
average more LET than HET clients are calling the quotations’s mean is 
going to be higher than was the case for a single day where the mean of 
all possible quotations has been computed. But with higher quotations 
on average variances are going to be higher on average while preserving 
the trend of competition’s impact.
Excess volatility is positive for the first two variance measures but 
decreasing in competition. Applying the VAT corresponding measure 
excess volatility is negative but increasing in competition. It is not clear 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this set of simulations each trader is using fictitious play as rule of 
updating. Prior beliefs are either 0 or 1 and are determined by a random 
device at the beginning of each simulation. Results are reported in the 
following table.
Convergence of beliefs, once again, is not affected by the presence 
of competition since updating behavior considers individual experience 
only. Individual beliefs do converge to the true value of the population’s 
distribution (this process has been described in Wuthe (1999)). Every 
trader’s quotations as well converge at the same speed as their respective 
updating does and, finally, converge all to the same value with minor 
fluctuations.
All variance measures differ significantly from zero during the first 
days only. Mean values of variance measures are close to zero. No clear 
trends can be identified with respect to competition. This is true because 
of the fast belief convergence which pulls each trader’s quotations quickly 
to a specific value which is identical for all. As for differences between the 
different variance measures only the variance of all traders’ quotations of 
all periods seems to be slightly higher than the other ones - due to the 
bigger number of observations which cover all the periods of the updating 
process.
Excess volatility is thus strongly negative. But competition has no 
impact at all on its size.
6.2 V olatility  B ehavior and C onvergence w ith  Fic­
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section a market with competition is simulated where evolutionary 
play takes place between traders. I.e. there are two groups of traders, 
one updating according to simplistic learning, the other one according 
to fictitious play. Members of each group play a pure strategy. The 
evolutionary process then takes place via switching of agents between 
groups according to relative performance. At the end of every day profits 
per individual of each updating rule are being compared; if one group 
has been more successful one trader of the other group will switch to it. 
Altogether there are 40 traders present.
The following ’mistrust’ interpretation has been implemented: If the 
evolutionary learning process converges to one of the two rules by default 
one member of the loosing party will survive. Thus, there is a contin­
uous control of the other updating rule’s performance. In case of an 
improvement traders will start to move back to the other rule.
As in the monopoly case convergence occurs with fictitious play being 
the dominant strategy. But due to the continuous checking of the other 
rule’s potential success this convergence outcome is unstable. In the 
simulations run here simplistic learning was able to gain back a weight 
of 0.1GG at around 152 days after convergence.
The simulation results resemble the fictitious learning outcome, only 
that all mean values are considerably bigger than beforehand. This is 
(hie to the impact of the early periods with an equally strong presence 
of simplistic players which averages up the quotation means and the size 
of the different variance measures.
While at first sight these results seem again to suggest a predominance 
of fictitious play, a look at the traders’ profits reveals that this is not 
the case: The mean daily profit of a trader under evolutionary play is 
about 8.56 foreign currency units. This has to be compared to the mean 
daily profit of a market where all traders are simplistic learners which is
6.3 V olatility  B ehavior and C onvergence w ith  Evo­
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of e g. Beltratti and Margarita (1992) and Gode and Sunder (1990), who 
showed that at some point it may not pay any more to be smart, or that 
zero intelligent agents are capable of seizing the entire possible surplus 
of a market. While in our case the simplest learning rule is not identi­
cal to the evolutionary dominant strategy it does keep the price process 
from settling down, and with a Folk theorem type of argument it can be 
argued that traders will choose to apply the simplistic learning rule.
Regarding competition’s impact on exchange rate volatility the set-up 
presented here gives a rather differentiated picture of the possible effects. 
The outcome varies with the volatility measure applied: Using those two 
measures that result into the relative highest levels of excess volatility 
the impact is decreasing in competition. The opposite is true for the 
third measure that has been used.
The effects of the introduction or strengthening of competition on 
spread and price are ambiguous. One of the common findings of the 
reviewed literature were either a reduction of the spread with increasing 
competition in inventory models or its remaining at the monopoly level. 
The spread showed to be independent of the inventory, only its placement 
was affected by the inventory. (See e.g. Ho and Stoll (1983) and Suvanto 
(1993).) In our model the spread’s independence of the inventory is 
preserved. But its size changes from period to period due to the belief 
updating process - the one of the quoting trader as well as the one of the 
other traders which is reflected in the changing average market spread.- 
The price which adjusts the inventory towards an equilibrium level and 
then towards a competitive equilibrium shows the same dependence on 
traders' updating behavior.
All results have been shown to depend in specific ways on customers’ 
price sensitivity, the volume of trade, and the population’s true distribu­
tion.
The findings of this paper confirm the importance of a market mi­





























































































given by 9.45 currency units. Following a Folk type argument simplistic 
learning will become the market’s equilibrium outcome.
This result is striking since the competitive process introduces a 
switch in traders’ learning behavior from fictitious play to simplistic 
learning, thus creating a volatile price structure that does never con­
verge. The reason for this outcome is that with competition prices are 
pulled together to the market average. Using simplistic learning the av­
erage spread becomes considerably bigger than with other learning rules. 
While this can create big period losses these become outweighed by even 
bigger period profits. The competitive mechanism of pulling prices to­
gether works less strongly with agents that can differ in their prices that 
much. In other words, the observed instability of the process stems from 
the fact that it pays to behave simplistically again: Applying the less 
conservative learning rule of simplistic learning allows for the possibility 
of higher profits. 11 (Notice, that in this set-up the arbitrage-avoidance 
imperative is not violated since for customers it is impossible to system­
atically exploit these big price differences: They are unpredictable.)
Hence, while we originally have introduced simplistic learning as a 
learning behavior on the lower end of a scale of sophistication it turns 
out that its followers may prove their full rationality by preferring it to 
other more sophisticated learning rules.
7 Conclusion
Introducing competition in the foreign exchange market this paper ex­
tends the analysis of a monopolistic environment in Wuthe (1999). Try­
ing to explain excess volatility of exchange rates we are able to give a 
rationale for the use of rather simple learning mechanisms: Their appli­
cation can be a sign of full rationality since they may allow to seize the 
relati%re highest profit. This result goes in line with some recent findings
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